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For centuries, the question of the free will has occupied human thoughts. Can 
we decide, direct, self-determine what we want and desire, what we will? In 
Catholic theology, Augustine of Hippo has prominently addressed this 
question, attempting to explain the existence of evil in the world in the face of 
an almighty and omniscient, but also graceful God. Augustine presupposed 
the existence of free will as a gift that was given from God to humans and 
deemed the wrong exercise of it to be the source of evil (Dilman, 1999: 1). Its 
rightful exercise on the other hand, was to be the source of good. It is only 
when the will is disconnected from the good, Augustine argued, that evil 
occurs in the world. The authorship of everything that is bad in the world was 
thus attached to humans and their misuse of God’s gift of the free will 
(Dilman, 1999: 81). Of course, there was a problem for that argument 
looming, one that Augustine only seemingly solved with his doctrine of a free 
human will: If God were almighty and omniscient as well as the creator of 
life, then he must have also created humans’ will and thus, their mistaken 
exercise of it. Therefore, the human ability to sin and do evil would simply be 
a creation of God, which is the very point that Augustine had attempted to 
avoid. The Christian debate on the topic built on top of the ethical 
considerations that were brought forward in ancient Greece and preceded an 
age of more scientific thinking, in which, as Dilman (1999: 256) has said, the 
concept of God’s foreknowledge had “lost its currency”. Thinkers of that later 
period, the Enlightenment, were concerned with discussing the possibility of 
the human will as an origin of earthly occurrences and therefore as the 
beginning of a causal relation (Dilman, 1999: 256). Later thinkers regard 
distinctive patterns in the behavior of every individual as an indicator for 
one’s predetermination of behavior (Dilman 1999: 2), further interpreting the 
liberty of will in a scientific, explainable manner. 
The problem of free will is still pertinent. Today, both positions still challenge 
us: Can I “decide” what to will? Or am I in some way predetermined in what I 
will? Modern science and technology have expanded on philosophy and we 
have moved on to a level on which we can in some instances explain or even 
observe how and when a will is formed in our minds (Mele, 2011). But 
regardless of what findings neurochemistry and neurobiology can present us 
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with, philosophy aims to find an answer as to what role our will may play in 
all aspects of human life. Criminal law is possibly the most obvious field of 
our modern existence in which the liberty of will plays a decisive role; put 
simply, the punishment by society’s institutions of someone who we can 
reliably identify as unable to have freely willed her actions can be regarded as 
questionable. But even in everyday life we judge other people’s actions on the 
basis of the alternative that they might have pursued; we blame someone for 
the lie that they have told, evaluate students on the basis of what they have or 
have not achieved, and try to force ourselves away from the things that are 
not healthy or in any other way good for us.  
But one of the most essential situations in which we (seemingly) exercise free 
will is in politics. Today, in many countries, this occurs through elections in 
which voters must choose a government that represents them and acts on 
their behalf in societal matters. This concept of a government, as an agent of 
the people, instituted by their will and consent, is closely associated with 
John Locke. As one of the most influential thinkers in the history of 
liberalism and its political revolutions (Laslett, 1988: 3), Locke theorized that 
society is built on a contract, agreed upon by its consenting members and 
from which authority is derived. This doctrine is one that is built on free 
choice and the consent, i.e. voluntary agreement, of its participants. As such, 
the question arises whether Locke himself has addressed the issue of free will 
and can thus help us to understand its importance and implication for the 
political idea of liberal democracy. Could his idea of a social contract 
withstand the consequences of a pre-determined mind? While this is in part 
simply an issue of one’s normative outlook, assessing his thoughts also means 
to assess some of the most essential principles of liberal democracy. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to discuss Locke’s political theory in light of his 
philosophy of human behavior and, specifically, of the free will.  
To do so, we must therefore start with a discussion about the contents of both 
of his theories. Locke’s work on the free will can be found in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (in the following: Essay). The book is an 
extensive discussion on the sources and limits of human knowledge and 
understanding as well as a general theory on the way the human mind, 
including language, operates (Uzgalis, 2016). My focus will therein lie on the 
Essay’s chapter of Power, which is of particular interest for our question 
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because in it, Locke discusses the extents and limits of humans as acting 
agents and of their mind as their faculty. This includes a comprehensive 
discussion about the topic of whether we are free when it comes to the will. In 
it, Locke eventually concludes that we are hedonistic by nature, determined 
in our will through the many feelings of “uneasiness” that we constantly 
endure and wish to satisfy.  
In the first chapter of this thesis, Locke’s argument will be explained in 
detail; this includes lexical explanations of the terms he employs. As Locke 
uses the specified terms quite strictly according to his own definitions 
throughout the Essay, this will be important for understanding his 
subsequent argument about the will and the means and ends of human 
behavior. To present said argument will be the task in the second part of the 
first chapter. 
Armed with our knowledge of Locke’s theory on will and behavior, we will 
then proceed to see what he envisioned for the field of politics. Locke has 
formulated his theory in the Two Treatises of Government of which only the 
second is of importance to us. As will again be outlined later during our 
discussion of the matter, the first of the Treatises is concerned with 
disproving the work of Robert Filmer including, importantly, his argument 
for why humans do not possess any naturally given rights. Although these 
rights are certainly important as an assumption for the later argument, the 
reasoning in favor of them is not of central relevance to our core question, 
which is concerned with the (in-) coherencies within Locke’s core theory of 
politics, that is, logically after he has made his assumptions. With regard to 
our question about the connection of Locke’s political theory to his concept of 
the human will, we will therefore focus on the core of the theory itself, 
contained in the second Treatise.                                                                                              
Locke’s social compact theory has been extremely influential and is a core 
component of modern political philosophy. In short, it is the concept of a 
liberal democracy, arisen out of the need for the protection of life and liberty. 
Locke argued that in a natural state, everyone possessed basic and equal 
rights as well as limitless freedom. This state of nature however leads to a 
situation of danger and chaos and thus eventually causes humans to exercise 
their freedom and consensually sign a contract that unites them in a polity 
that will protect them and their naturally given rights. We will, for the 
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purpose of this work, not proceed to explain how in particular Locke 
constructs the political system that follows from the contract. It must suffice 
to say that he envisions a government with majority rule, which is based on 
the consent of its citizens and restraint in its authority by the separation of its 
powers.1 
Locke’s political theory contains the idea that humans must be able to freely 
choose one thing over another and, especially choose, i.e. consent to, the 
polity that Locke argues for. In the last and central part of our analysis it 
must thus be determined, in accordance with what Locke considered to be 
free or freely willed, whether this is so. Essentially, we must compare the 
definitions of liberty and the liberty to will from the Essay with his theory in 
the Treatises and determine whether the two positions are coherent. Is 
human behavior as described in the political theory consistent with the 
determinants of it described in the Essay? Specifically, do we will and act as 
free or not free in the Treatises as has been described in the Essay? This will 
lead us to our final discussion in which we shall attempt to summarize what 
we have learned and discuss its implications. In particular, due to Locke’s 
influence, this thesis will also assess some of the core problems of liberal 
democracy in general.  
Peter Laslett has argued that the two parts of Locke’s work, i.e. his 
philosophical writing in the Essay and his political theory in the Treatises, are 
best kept apart. He claims that “Locke is, perhaps, the least consistent of the 
great philosophers” and that he himself sometimes seemed to be unaware of 
that fact (Laslett, 1988: 82). The unfairness that lies in the approach of this 
thesis, inherent to the attempt of analyzing the incoherency of a philosopher 
who apparently did not strive for consistency, may then be forgiven only by 
Locke himself; but on the matter of the still remaining relevancy of my work 
two things may be said: First, in response to Laslett’s assessment of Locke’s 
coherency, that the fact that he did not write one “single, synthetic system” 
(Laslett, 1988: 86) simply makes it even more important and more 
interesting to discuss the discrepancies that lie within it. Second, both 
Locke’s theory of the free will and his political theory would alone be 
                                                   
1 Locke’s theory on government can be found in the chapters X – XIX of the second Treatise. 
For an overview, see Locke on Government by D.A. Lloyd Thomas.  
 7 
significant enough to be compared to each other, regardless of who their 
author was. Therefore, the question of coherency is rather a means of 
assessing the different implications for Locke’s thoughts, than a witch-hunt 
for mistakes that he may have made when it comes to the coherency of his 
writing. It is also important to note that both Laslett himself (1988: 83) and, 
in more depth, Neal Wood (1983: 176 – 182) have argued for the political 
implications and relevance of the Essay in addition to the Treatises, which 
lies in Locke’s radically individualistic and anti-authoritarian anthropology. 
Thus to make such a connection within Locke’s work is to add to its better 
understanding.                                                                                                       
Besides Peter Laslett, who has consolidated the first critical edition of Locke’s 
Treatises (1988: ix), and who has therein given an invaluable introductory 
comment on the book, a number of other authors have helped me to form an 
opinion on the matters in this thesis. Despite the fact that I attempted to 
write about Locke solely on the basis of his own words, my additional reading 
has been very essential in forming my own analysis and interpretation. Leo 
Strauss, himself an influential political philosopher, has written extensively 
on the topic of liberalism and his book Natural Right and History was 
especially helpful for an assessment of Locke’s concept of a state of nature. 
Other authors of special relevance to Locke’s work and his political theory are 
John Dunn, who was particularly interesting due to his exciting analysis of 
the concept of consent, and James Tully, who has written on Locke’s idea of 
property and his concept of natural law (Tuckness, 2016). I must also 
mention Neal Wood’s very exciting book The Politics of Locke’s Philosophy, 
which is about the political implications implicit in Locke’s Essay. I have also 
taken great advantage of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in 
particular articles written and edited by Alex Tuckness, William Uzgalis, 
Edward N. Zalta and Samuel Rickless. The Encyclopedia has allowed me to 
gain an overview and a sense of direction for the topics included in my thesis 
and was useful when it came to putting parts of Locke’s thought into the 
context of his larger work. Quite helpful in a similar way was John Yolton’s 
Locke Dictionary, which provides an idea of every major concept in his opus.  
To provide references, I have attempted to coherently use the Harvard Style 
following each information, thought, or argument that did not originate from 
me in order to rightfully designate other people’s work as their own. To make 
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it more transparent in the face of the many different editions of Locke’s work, 
I have used the abbreviations Essay for the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding and TT for the Two Treatises of Government2 to reference 
his two herein relevant books, followed by the respective chapter number and 
paragraph. Concerning the editions of the two books, which is an important 
point due to the changes Locke made over time, I have used the fifth edition 
of the Essay, re-published in 1706 not too long after his death, as well as the 
critical edition of the Treatises provided by Peter Laslett in 1970. 
 
  
                                                   
2 In three instances, I have quoted Immanuel Kant, namely Perpetual Peace (zum Ewigen 
Frieden), which I referenced as FR, and On the Old Saw (Über den Gemeinspruch), which I 
referenced as GE, followed respectively by the page numbers of the original Academy 
Edition.                                                                                                                                                  
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2. Whether Man’s Will be Free, or No 
2.1. Essential Terms of Locke’s Theory of the Free Will 
Power 
To possess power, for Locke, is “in one thing the possibility of having any of 
its simple Ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that 
change”. This relates to his concept of a simple idea and means that to 
possess a certain power over something means to have the ability to change 
that something’s basic, distinguishing features, its simple ideas; likewise, 
power is also the ability of the thing being changed to be changed. This 
dualistic definition of power being split between a subject and an object leads 
Locke to differentiate between active and passive powers, the first being the 
ability to change something’s simple ideas the second being the ability of 
something to have its simple ideas changed (Essay, II.XXI, § 1 – 2). 
 
Will & Volition 
One such power is the will, for according to Locke (Essay, II.XXI, § 5) it is the 
power of the mind “to order the consideration of any Idea, or the forbearing 
to consider it, or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and 
vice versâ in any particular instance”. In other words, it is the power to prefer 
thinking or doing one thing to thinking or doing another. Going back to the 
definition of power it must be asked: Why is will a power then? What is it that 
can be changed by the will in its simple idea? It is the volition (or willing), 
which is the actual action of making use of the power to will. Locke defines 
volition simply as the “directing” or “forbearing” of an action. The two terms 
are important to keep apart, as they do not belong to the same category: The 
will is a power which something possesses, while a volition is an action, 
namely the action that may follow from the power to will. This difference is 
crucial for Locke’s subsequent arguments, as we will see later on.  
 
Liberty & Necessity 
Writing about the mind’s control over humans’ will, Locke argues, one must 
ask about liberty and necessity. According to him, liberty is the power “to do 
or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of 
the mind”. Therefore, whenever a person is equally unrestrained to act or not 
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Locke‘s typology from of Power (author’s own table) 
to act in a manner, this person possesses liberty with regard to that action. If, 
even though the will demands it, either the forbearing or execution of that 
action is not possible to that person, then that person is at necessity to act in 
a respective manner and is not at liberty. It is important to understand this 
concept from an external perspective: Not the volition, determined by the 
mind’s power to will, is what is causing the necessity; it is a restraint from 
outside the agent that causes her not to be free. The famous example given by 
Locke himself is a man locked inside a room with a person he desires to be 
with. This man may be in the room voluntarily because of his wish to be with 
that person; yet regardless of his volition and his mind’s determination, he 
would not be at liberty to leave the room, but is by necessity restrained to 
remain in it (Essay, II.XXI, § 8 – 10). Just as our bodily actions, Locke argues 
that our thoughts may also be restrained and compelled from external 
influences. A passion or feeling of pain may have us consider ideas that have 
not originally been willed to be considered; however, the mind may regain its 




2.2. Locke’s Argument about the Determination of the 
Human Will 
 
Uneasiness as the Determination of the Will 
Following the typology we have seen so far, Locke argues that the question 
“whether man’s will be free, or no” is in fact “altogether improper”. How does 
he arrive at that conclusion? Essentially, he believes that the question is a 
mistake of categories. Because both liberty and will are powers, they cannot 
be possessed by one another; only an agent like the mind or “Man” may have 
the power of being free in something, i.e. an action. For Locke, they are 
simply two powers that are independent, but which may be used alongside 
Agent Power Action 
Mind Will & Liberty  Volition/Willing 
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one another: “Liberty, […] is the power a Man has to do or forbear doing any 
particular action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual 
preference in the mind, which is the same thing as to say, according as he 
himself wills it.” He admits then, that liberty and will are not entirely 
independent, yet only because they are both powers possessed by the mind, 
exercised by it shortly after one another (Essay, II.XXI, § 14 – 19). 
Thus having established that it is not proper to ask whether the will is free, 
Locke says that the actual question at hand is “whether a man be free” or, 
more specifically, “whether a man be free to will”; that is, whether humans 
have the ability to freely choose whether they want to exercise their power to 
will. Again, he denies this. His argument is quite simple: Whenever the 
choice of acting one or the other way is presented to a person, this person 
necessarily has to will acting in one way or the other; even if that person 
determines to pursue no action whatsoever, she must still will not to act 
(Essay, II.XXI, § 23 – 24). If we think back to Locke’s definition of liberty, 
that person then does not have the power “to do or forbear” the action at 
hand and thus, does not possess liberty in this matter (Essay, II.XXI, § 8). In 
other words, one is not free to will because one is not able to forbear willing; 
never can a person be able not to will with regard to an action (Essay, II.XXI, 
§ 24).  
Having dismissed the questions about the liberty of the will and the freedom 
to will, because the will is no agent but a power, Locke turns to another 
inquiry: What is it then, that determines the will if we must definitively will 
but when it is not the will which determines itself? The short and easy answer 
is, the mind. As the agent possessing the power of will, it must be the mind, 
which determines it or rather, its subsequent action, which is volition. Of 
course to some degree, this simply follows from logic if Locke’s theory is to be 
consistent; if the will is a power and volition an action then something has to 
own the one and exercise the other. How as opposed to what determines the 
will still remains unclear though. Locke therefore proceeds to explain this 
very point. He claims that every continuation of an action or a current state 
merely constitutes satisfaction with it. What does that mean? Essentially that 
whenever we do not change a circumstance, then we are content with it, as 
otherwise we would act to alter it. But every circumstance that does indeed 
concern us is subject to our urge to change it. Therefore, we engage to 
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address our feeling, which is the feeling that we would like to alter what we 
are not content with. Thus, “the motive to change is always some uneasiness 
[…]. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, 
which for shortness sake we will call determining of the will” (Essay, II.XXI, 
§ 29). The argument, so far, is quite simply stated then: The human mind 
being an agent with the power to will, is the sole authority determining it; as 
such, it is itself determined by a desire for the feeling of satisfaction or rather, 
the (impending) lack thereof, which is called uneasiness.  
 
The Greater Good 
Locke explains that what does not determine our mind in its power to will 
however is the greater good. Colloquially, and perhaps generally, the meaning 
of the term is of course immediately associated with some sort of a higher 
normative objective like social justice or peace. This is not what Locke meant 
by the term with regard to the will. Instead, Locke was referring to a greater 
good on an individual level. According to Locke, the greater good is “by the 
general consent of all Mankind” considered to be what determines the will. 
What he means is that humans are generally considered to act in a way that is 
likely to result in something that is somehow objectively good for them. 
Although we will see later that he believes humans can indeed act in such a 
way, at this point Locke seemingly denies this. He counters it with the 
example of a “drunkard” who knows that his life will likely take a more 
negative turn if he keeps drinking, yet continues to go to a “tavern” and enjoy 
nightlife. Against better judgment, and although he is aware of the negative 
consequences, the drunkard will again succumb to the feeling of uneasiness 
that is a result of not drinking and will decide to join his friends in the 
“tavern”. Of course nowadays this example is somewhat inappropriate, 
especially considering that alcoholism and substance addiction are regarded 
as serious mental illnesses (WHO, 2016) and not a personal character flaw. 
Locke provides other examples3 that are arguably less eloquent yet mean to 
prove the same point, namely that it is the uneasiness of the moment, rather 
                                                   
3 The two other examples are a man who cannot be convinced to behave in a virtuous way, 
thus not seeing the greater good that would be inherent in a change of his behavior, and a 
poor man who does not see the merits of escaping his status.  
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than our better judgment of the great scheme of things in our life, that 
determine us with regard to how and what we will. Being free of that 
uneasiness is what “we all aim at in all our actions” and the prerequisite of 
human happiness. Thus, “when the uneasiness to miss his [the drunkard’s] 
accustomed delight returns, the greater acknowledged good loses its hold” 
(Essay, II.XXI, § 35).  
It appears that the discussion of the greater good is an attempt by Locke to 
separate the human ability to act in accordance with some sort of reason or at 
least contemplation from their predetermination through mere urges. We 
will however later see that he does put reason and deliberation back into the 
equation of the determination of the will. This brings us to the two last points 
of our examination: Locke’s concepts of desire and suspension.  
 
The Uneasiness of Desire 
Desire is a particular uneasiness, which Locke says is a feeling fixed on the 
want for a presently absent good in our minds; perhaps, one could say that he 
means to describe a “long-term” uneasiness. Being constantly in pursuit of 
what we desire, every uneasiness of the moment derives itself from that 
pursuit. Thus, it appears that he believes that we have desires, which we 
follow in the longer term but which nevertheless determine what makes us 
uneasy at the present moment. Seemingly, Locke aims to differentiate 
between the thought of a present discontent with a particular circumstance 
(e.g. hunger, thirst), expressed immediately in the mind as uneasiness, from 
the things that we desire in the mid- or long-term; yet at the same time, he 
believes that such desires shape what sort of uneasiness we may feel in the 
present moment. He calls this idea the “uneasiness of desire, fixed on some 
absent good, either negative, as indolence to one in pain; or positive, as 
enjoyment of pleasure.” He argues that this forms the course of our actions, 
as it sets out all our successive actions, which follow alongside the lines of the 
pursuit of our desire (Essay, II.XXI, § 31 – 33). Locke takes this as the reason 
for why desire and will might often be confused with another; he claims that 
the will “seldom orders any action, nor is there any voluntary action 
performed, without some desire accompanying it”. Thus, being always 
accompanied by a desire, the will is mistaken for it (Essay, II.XXI, § 39). 
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It appears that desire is viewed by Locke as some sort of ordering force for 
the many feelings of uneasiness that we possess. Interestingly, at this stage, 
he all but ignores the question of how one form of uneasiness takes precedent 
over another. Locke simply argues that people will attempt to address the 
uneasiness that is most “pressing” and most attainable first because if 
humans were to try to achieve something unattainable, “that would be to 
suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to lose its 
labor” (Essay, II.XXI, § 40). This argument is insufficient and its logic is 
twisted: At first, Locke does not provide us with an explanation as to why an 
uneasiness might be pressing and then naïvely exchanges what is 
unattainable with what is merely difficult to attain for the sake of his 
argument. If something were difficult to attain, but attainable, it would be 
impossible for Locke to argue that this would be less likely to be attempted 
due to the loss of labor, because there would be no such loss. In fact the 
result, i.e. an end to the uneasiness, would eventually be achieved even if it 
means more hardship. Arguably, from a perspective of Locke’s philosophy, it 
would instead have been more convincing to claim that there are qualities to 
the different feelings of uneasiness, and that the stronger one such feeling is, 
the more urgently we aim to satisfy it. It must be assumed that Locke either 
did not see his fallacy or that for some reason, he sacrificed consistency for 
another agenda. However, especially with regard to his theory about 
happiness, which we will now discuss, it is quite inconceivable what that 
agenda might have been. In fact, Locke’s theory of happiness does not order 
actions by their attainability and instead entails a utilitarian principle of 
desire, which orders actions based on the desirability of their result. 
Locke claims that happiness “in its full extent is the utmost pleasure we are 
capable of” while its opposite, misery, is “the utmost pain”. This conception 
of happiness is quite individual for Locke, as it differs from person to person. 
Thus, someone may concede that a thing is to be regarded as very pleasurable 
without personally desiring it and, importantly, without being unhappy in its 
absence. Every person thus receives happiness, i.e. the feeling of pleasure, 
from something else and will then desire in accordance to what that 
happiness is: “Happiness (…) every one constantly pursues, and desires what 
makes any part of it” (Essay, II.XXI, § 41 – 43). Let us follow back Locke’s 
argument to our original question about whether the will is free in his way of 
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thought. Of course liberty has not been mentioned here, but it remains 
important to clarify how the argument he makes about happiness fits into his 
concept of the will. If all our desires are determined by what pleases us, i.e. 
gives us happiness, then all our uneasiness equally derives from what makes 
us happy, or rather, unhappy. As our uneasiness in turn determines the will, 
it must be clear that it is our general struggle for happiness and content, 
which forms what we will.4 That being said, we are a step closer to Locke’s 
views of the matter and have seen his arguments about the determinants of 
the will, but we have yet to hear the last of it when it comes to how much 
liberty we possess in all of this. It must suffice to say for now, that Locke 




The will according to Locke is determined by our various feelings of 
uneasiness, which derive from our pursuit of happiness. At this point, Locke 
introduces another element with which he turns back to the discussion of 
liberty in the context of the will. This element is the human ability “to 
suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one 
after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on 
all sides, and weigh them with others.” He argues that the liberty to consider 
before willing is precisely what is commonly (and improperly) referred to as 
free will and that all liberty derives from it, because if there were anything 
else than our own judgment that settles the will, this would necessarily mean 
that there is no liberty in its determination. Thus “to deny, that a man’s will, 
in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills 
and acts for an end that he would not have at the time that he wills and acts 
for it.” Interestingly, Locke also claims that the power to suspend is the 
reason why we sometimes make wrong decisions, saying that “from the not 
using it right comes all the variety of mistakes” as we “engage too soon before 
due examination” (Essay, II.XXI, § 47 – 48). Locke later (Essay, II.XXI, § 58 
– 64) elaborates on the source of our mistakes and explains that our 
                                                   
4 A graphical explanation of the entire chain of determination can be found at the beginning 
of chapter four. 
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judgment of more immediate pleasures and pains is more sound and that we 
can therefore better determine whether they are constructive to our 
happiness. Thence, whenever something is more distant, we wrongly evaluate 
what will make us happy, causing our uneasinesses to develop in a way 
contrary to what would actually have made us happy. Again, he returns to an 
example involving alcohol, claiming that hardly anyone would drink it if the 
immediate effect would involve the pain of “that sick stomack, and aking 
head”.  
 
Locke’s argument is quite curious: so far, we have seen that he believes the 
mind to be determining the will according to the uneasiness it presently 
endures. However, in his suspension doctrine, he claims that such 
determination of the will depends only on “one’s own judgment” or otherwise 
there would not be any liberty in its determination, as “some other than 
himself” would determine it (Essay, II.XXI, § 48). It must follow then, that 
when he talks about one’s own judgment, what he means is the mind, or a 
process within it, as it is what he claims to usually determine the will in 
accordance with any present uneasiness. Therefore, if the mind both 
immediately determines the will to address an uneasiness and also re-
determines the will after suspending the act of willing (volition), then we 
must ask: why was it previously, or is it usually, not determined by “due 
examination”, but by our feelings of uneasiness, as Locke claims throughout 
his entire argument up to this point? Of course it is arguable that the power 
to suspend is in fact applicable to the act of willing, i.e. that we may suspend 
to will to do something and that thus the whole theory of suspension fits 
easily into his theory of the will. However, even after exercising the power of 
suspension, we must then eventually will, and must therein be either 
determined by an immediate uneasiness or re-determined due to our ability 
to reason and examine. In short, one may wonder: Why is the mind at one 
time determined by a feeling of uneasiness and at another time, by its own 
contemplation? 
It can be said in Locke’s defense that he did not include acts of willing that 
are immediately necessary and present to us into his theory of suspension, 
possibly because they cannot be examined beforehand due to their urgency 
and thus, willing to do or forbear them in one way or another cannot be 
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suspended. To this, Locke simply says that the mind has the power to 
suspend “in most cases” (Essay, II.XXI, § 47). As we have already seen, he 
also believes that those pleasures and pains that are more immediate can be 
more clearly perceived and evaluated by us, thus causing us to be able to 
know which action is the preferable one whenever it is more closely present 
to us (Essay, II.XXI, § 58). For now, this argument presents only a small 
comfort, as it does not really help to solve the underlying problem of 
uneasiness versus any sort of human reason as determinant of the will; 
ultimately, one can hardly argue that in a more urgent situation, 
consideration is entirely unable to operate and comes not into play while in 
another, in which there is more time available, we calmly examine and 
evaluate our choices, notwithstanding our uneasinesses. However, the 
apparent inconsistency we are presented with here is in actuality quite a 
coherent part of his theory. First, it should be said that Locke does not 
explicitly call the determinant of the will after suspension “reason” in the 
sense of a rational ability to evaluate. Thus, it could very well be said that he 
simply means to say that we can reevaluate our desires and thereby our 
current feelings of uneasiness, eventually deciding that the one rather than 
the other is more pressing, if only we have more time due to the suspension 
of action. In his argument, the suspension that we are capable of is simply a 
means to consider our outlook on happiness and on the order of the 
uneasinesses we feel; while withholding our decision on an action, we realign 
its potential consequences with what we believe to bring us happiness and 
thus newly determine what we desire, and whose absence will make us feel 
uneasy. That Locke intended his theory to be interpreted this way is 
especially apparent considering that he starts his discussion about 
suspension with the question about which uneasiness will take precedence.  
 
Locke thus presents us with a human being driven by a hedonistic nature and 
urges that are in need to be fulfilled in order to achieve happiness, our most 
superior goal. Importantly however, this creature seems to be able to duly 
contemplate about its desires, weighing the advantages of attempting to 
achieve the one, or the other, eventually re-determining what it wills. The 
freedom in this ability appears to lie in the independence from outside 
influences rather than in the freedom to entirely control what one wills by the 
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power of one’s mind. Ultimately, the mind as presented by Locke, will follow 
one of its feelings of uneasiness when determining what it wills. In this, it is 
free from anything else.  
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3. Political Theory 
 
The State of Nature 
John Locke begins his political philosophy by refuting all claims that political 
power can derive its legitimacy from being inherited from the first man, 
Adam, and thus from God. In fact, his entire first treatise is an attack on the 
work of Robert Filmer, who argued in favor of absolute monarchy on the 
basis of a hereditary principle going back to the first human. Locke aimed to 
disprove Filmer’s theory by attacking its core: that we are by nature not free 
(Uzgalis, 2016). This, as Locke believes, is not valid as the genealogy Filmer 
presents as an argument for his theory cannot possibly be proven and even if 
it could, would not suffice to legitimize political power (TT, I, § 1). Instead, 
Locke asks the reader to “consider what estate all men are naturally in”, 
namely one in which they have complete liberty, independent of others’ will 
and in control of all their belongings. In this state of nature, all are equal, as 
they are of the same species and thus possess the same abilities and 
characteristics (TT, II, § 4). However, a law of nature, which forbids everyone 
to harm themselves, their property as well as one another, governs this state. 
The law must, by lack of a central authority, be executed by everyone. Any 
offender who transgresses the law of nature and thus leaves the ground of 
“reason and common equity” is to be punished accordingly. Such punishment 
is the only lawful power one person may have over another and may only be 
used in proportion to a crime; moreover, from the crime, two different rights 
derive themselves: The right of the person harmed by the crime to claim 
reparations through the punishment and the right to punish regardless of 
one’s own being harmed in the crime in order to discourage and restrain 
future offences (TT, II, § 6 – 8).                            
This line of thought may seem oddly inconsistent and even naïve and has 
indeed been criticized not only in modern times, but also by contemporaries 
of Locke. Laslett (1988: 80) discusses in some length how James Tyrell 
challenged Locke on the topic and holds himself that “throughout his political 
work, the expression natural law is used with suave assurance, as if there 
could be no doubt of its existence, of its meaning, of its content in the mind of 
author and reader.” Leo Strauss explains in Natural Right and History 
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(1953: 202) that Locke claimed the natural law to be deductible from reason 
with almost mathematical precision, but that he failed ever to do so. Almost 
mockingly, Laslett (1988: 81) observes that despite his claim of its certain 
existence “it seems that it was always ‘beside the present purpose’ for Locke 
to demonstrate the existence and content of natural law”. The debate around 
the topic focuses to a large part on whether the state of nature and the law of 
nature were meant by Locke to be mere thought-experiments rather than an 
actual description of a law or a historical circumstance of humans living in a 
pre-societal situation (Tuckness, 2016). We will address this specific matter 
again when we discuss the natural law as portrayed in the Treatises with 
regard to its possible relation to human will and liberty in the Essay. For 
now, we must return to the more general line of argument in Locke’s theory. 
Ignoring the possible fallacies in Locke’s theory of the law of nature and 
viewed from a perspective of eloquence and effective narration, Locke quickly 
turns his apparently insufficient theory around and, in a cunning twist, 
transforms it into an attack on absolute rule.5 After anticipating the obvious 
counter-argument against the practicality of his natural law, namely that 
humans are incapable judges, driven by emotions and partiality, he admits 
that only a disorderly and chaotic system will arise from the state of nature he 
describes. Thus “God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the 
partiality and violence of men. I easily grant that civil government is the 
proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature (…). But I shall 
desire those who make this objection to remember that absolute monarchs 
are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils (…), I desire 
to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the 
state of nature, where one man commanding a multitude has the liberty to be 
judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases” 
(TT, II, § 13). Although this is not the place, and the debate about Locke’s 
state of nature quite another topic, it may be theorized that the apparently 
implausible state of nature is but a criticism of the underlying assumptions of 
autocratic rule and, in line with other interpretations of Locke, a mere 
thought experiment (Tuckness, 2016). Locke admits that in a state where any 
                                                   
5 Strauss (1953: 229, see below) supports the view that the law of nature is, due to its 
inconsistency, merely a theorem for arguing in favor of the social contract.   
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human can, without restraint, be the judge over another, chaos will arise, 
which must be remedied by the institution of a government; but because a 
single ruler is nothing more than a person that governs and judges without 
restraint, it is questionable whether such a polity would be the right cure for 
the deficits of human nature. This is the heart of Locke’s political theory and 
raises one of its central questions: If human nature is prone to violence, how 
can a government be formed that guarantees liberty and protection from such 
violence if that government is itself a human one and thus, potentially evil? 
 
The Social Contract 
Because all humans are free and independent in the state of nature, Locke 
argues, they must not be put under the power of another. Only by their 
consent and in agreement with others can they “join and unite into a 
community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst 
another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security 
against any that are not of it.” In such a newly formed political body, people 
curtail some of their previously existing liberty and accede power to the 
community, or rather, to its majority, which from then on assumes power to 
act on behalf of the rest and the group at large (TT, VIII, § 95 – 96). 
Why would people form a contract with one another instead of remaining as 
free and equal as in the state of nature? Locke argues that because everyone 
has the same unlimited freedom by nature, that this situation is also one of 
danger. Because there is no authority that could execute the laws of nature, 
one could be overstepping the law of nature and harm another at any given 
time. Thus, mutually threatened people form a society and, “not without 
reason”, agree to let go of some of their former liberty in order to achieve “the 
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates”, the three 
components of what Locke calls property. But such a contract between people 
will not only engender protection; Locke believes that by common consent, a 
society will establish a system of what is right and what is wrong, providing a 
basis for deciding on all differences that might occur between its members. 
Locke claims that this is necessary since the law of nature, which had been in 
place before, was not ably functioning as a binding law, being broken 
constantly due to personal interests. Judges will be instituted to decide on 
controversies, while an executive force will be necessary to guarantee that 
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such decisions are respected. In face of the inconveniences that come with 
the state of nature, primarily the uncertainty that is a result of the constant 
exercise of power over others, humans seldom remain in the state of nature. 
“It is this”, Locke says, “that makes them so willingly give up every one his 
singly power” (TT, IX, § 123 – 127).  
Importantly, in order to sign the contract, consent is necessary. In the 
Treatises, Locke himself addresses this issue to a considerable extent. 
Specifically, he points to two problems that arise from the doctrine: First, 
that no such situation in which humans did actually found a new polity by 
signing a contract is known; second, that those who have already been born 
under a government are unable to object to that government and thus, cannot 
give their consent. To the first he responds (TT, VIII, § 101) that records of a 
state of nature preceding a social contract have simply not been preserved 
and that just because we have no knowledge or definite proof of it, we must 
not assume that it did not exist. This is especially so, since “Government is 
everywhere antecedent to records” (TT, VIII, § 100 – 122). 
It should, as we will see later, be of more interest to our endeavor whether 
there can be consent in an already established society. Locke appears to 
directly link this to a right to resist, which he however explains more 
explicitly at a later point (TT, XIX, § 222). Locke claims (TT, VIII, § 113) that 
whenever there is someone who is subject to the power of someone else, that 
this person could just as well unite with others to form a new polity; 
therefore, no one will live in a society to which no consent was given because 
then, that person would simply sign a new contract and join another polity. 
Locke commences his argument by asking “How so many lawful monarchies 
[came] into the world” and seems thereby to be hinting at the arbitrariness of 
political power.6 The fact that a single person can claim to possess power of 
an entire society implies that power can never be rightfully obtained in that 
                                                   
6 Unfortunately, this is not the place to discuss Locke’s stance on the arbitrariness of political 
power. It would indeed be exciting, especially due to Locke’s importance in political theory, 
to reconstruct his opinion on the matter and evaluate how it corresponds to more recent 
philosophy on the topic. Nietzsche in particular emphasized how it is language and 
convention that form power (Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn, 1873) and 
laid the foundation for later post-structuralist theories from the 1960s and 1970s, which 
remain influential until today.  
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way. For Locke, the only legitimate source of power is the consent of the 
governed. From the right to resist and form a new government derives, and 
so Locke concludes (TT, VIII, § 119 - 122.), that there is a distinction between 
explicit and tacit consent. The former is expressed in an obvious way, for 
instance by willingly joining a society through the signing of a contract. The 
latter derives itself implicitly from the enjoyment of any of the advantages an 
already established society may provide, such as protection or roads to travel 
on. Thus, whenever someone is born into a political society, this person 
automatically consents “prima facie” by not resisting the previously 
established order (Dunn, 1967: 181). Simply put, the lack of unwillingness to 
be part of a society is consent sufficient enough for Locke to make someone a 
signatory of his social contract.  
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4. Political Theory in Relation to Free Will  
4.1. Hedonistic Signatories  
We have seen that Locke believes humans to be essentially hedonistic, 
determined in what they will by the uneasinesses they feel, which in turn is 
derived from whatever makes them personally happy. This is the most basic 
principle of his theory about our behavior and we must now apply it to 
Locke’s political theory. To do so, let us climb down the ladder of thought 
from happiness until will. 













As we have already learned, Locke defines happiness as the presence of 
pleasure and the absence of pain (Essay, II.XXI, § 42). What can we identify 
as the happiness his signatories are seeking when they are signing the 
contract? He believes them to be seeking security for their property (TT, IX, § 
123), that is, their life, liberty and estates. Thus, their pleasure must derive 
from the presence of the security that the social contract promises them. 
Accordingly, the state of nature causes people to feel pain and misery due to 
its constant danger. It follows that in the state of nature they have first a 
desire for the stability of society, then feel uneasiness due to the absence of 
society and, therefore, have a will determined to sign the contract. Humans 
will establish a legal and legislative system, thereby eliminating vigilantism 
and the chaos that results from violence and the transgression of power by 







(author’s own table) 
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people’s desire and so, after having joined society, they eventually receive 
sufficient pleasure for it to be added to their happiness.7 Put simply, Locke’s 
signatories of the social contract reduce the pain of living in uncertainty and 
danger, while maximizing their pleasure through the stability of a protected 
life. 
For a brief moment, let us return solely to the Essay and see how Locke 
himself makes a connection between the pursuit of happiness and the 
possession of liberty. After having defined happiness, he argues that our 
seeking of it is a prerequisite for and the “foundation of liberty”. Essentially, 
Locke appears to believe that the more focused we are on pursuing what 
makes us happy, the more free we are in its pursuit. Considering his 
definition of liberty, that necessarily implies that we are more free from 
external restraint and thus able to do or forbear as we please, whenever we 
strongly hold on to what makes us happy. This is again apparent when he 
argues that the more we are bound to “an unalterable pursuit of our 
happiness in general, (…) the more we are free from any necessary 
determination of our will”. Here, the use of the term “necessary” suggests 
that Locke means to say that the pursuit of happiness is the path to liberty as 
it frees us from any necessities that externally restrain our actions. Only after 
having our happiness clearly determined are we entirely free, as without such 
determination, which follows from suspension, we do not to our full ability 
achieve the power to do or forbear without restraint, the fullest achievement 
of happiness being only possible after having precisely determined our will 
(Essay, II.XXI, § 51).  
What can we say about this in connection with Locke’s political theory? 
Certainly, and following what we have said previously, that by agreeing to the 
contract, the signatories are following their pursuit of happiness and that 
this, just as Locke declared the pursuit of happiness would do, leads them 
directly to their liberty; the liberty being possible because of the fact that they 
have left the restraints of the state of nature behind them and engaged in a 
society that protects their power to do or forbear in accordance with the 
determination of their mind. In humans’ hedonistic pursuit of their own 
                                                   
7 Following Locke’s definition, this is not to say that they are then and therefore happy. 
However, there will then be additional pleasure present, which will add to happiness.  
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happiness, and here Locke’s two theories are quite coherent, we can find their 
ability to pursue a free life within society. 
 
4.2. Voluntary or Necessary Consent? 
Locke’s contract theory of a political society is based on the consent of those 
that form it. Because everyone is free in the state of nature, their consent is 
necessary in order for them to yield their liberty to a government. In other 
words, it needs to be voluntary for the contract to be agreed upon. In the 
Essay, Locke’s thinking on the topic of voluntariness is essential to his 
understanding of liberty; we have seen that he believes it is only possible for a 
person to be free if her ability to act is entirely unrestrained by external 
influences, meaning that it is voluntary. At any given time in which this is not 
the case, a person’s action is no longer voluntary, but necessary (Essay, 
II.XXI, § 8 – 10). Thus, if Locke claims that the social contract comes into 
existence through the free (think: voluntary) choice of its signatories, then 
they must have been under no necessity, that is, without any external 
restraint that would have forced them to sign in one way or another.  
Let us now determine whether this is so. In the state of nature, humans are 
entirely free “to order their actions” (TT, II, § 4). In this then, Locke strictly 
and almost literally follows the definition that is originally given in the Essay 
of what constitutes liberty. But, despite being free, said humans are not, as 
Locke says, “in a state of licence”; instead, they are restricted by the law of 
nature (TT, II, § 6). From a hasty reading of the Treatises, this line of thought 
may seem perfectly clear: humans are, in the state of nature, entirely free 
except if they transgress the law of nature. But considering that to fulfill the 
definition of liberty in the Essay they must be free of external restraint, we 
are obliged to ask if the natural law constitutes such external restraint in any 
way. This brings us to the question of who is to enforce the natural law in 
Locke’s theory. Strauss has argued (1953: 222) that “in order to be a law, the 
law of nature must have sanctions”, meaning that the law of nature must be 
enforced by someone. Locke explicitly agrees (TT, II, § 7): “for the law of 
Nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain if 
there were nobody that in the state of Nature had a power to execute that 
law”. He goes on to draw the inevitable conclusion from this, namely that if 
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everyone is perfectly equal, then everyone is also entitled to punish another. 
Strauss believes (1953: 229) that the state of nature is therefore not the 
portrayal of an actual historical circumstance, but a thought-experiment. It 
“formulates the conditions of peace or, more generally stated, of ‘public 
happiness’” and thus, when it is not in effect, “public misery” is the result, for 
which the cure is the social contract Locke envisions. How can we relate this 
to the decision about the signing of the contract, the liberty of which we are 
currently trying to determine? While the authority of the law of nature, 
especially following Strauss’ interpretation, is certainly no external restraint 
on liberty, the “public misery” may indeed constitute such an external 
restraint, thus limiting the essential liberty with which the contract is signed. 
This may seem counter-intuitive, as the danger that arises from the state of 
nature is the very reason why the signatories agree to the contract and not a 
restraint on their decision; but, as we will now see, the absence of an 
alternative due to external danger and thus the absence of a real choice in the 
matter is exactly what constitutes necessary as opposed to voluntary consent 
as Locke defines it.  
At a first reading, Locke is very clear on the voluntariness of the signatories’ 
decision, claiming that only because they are free, can they waive their liberty 
and join the political body; therefore, when someone is signing the contract, 
this individual “seeks out and is willing to join in society”. What makes a 
person possess the will to give personal power and liberty up to a larger 
societal body is, as we have heard, the disorder in the state of nature (TT, IX, 
§ 123). However, as previously suggested, this chaotic state of nature is 
indeed an external circumstance which is determinant of the decision to join 
society. Therefore we need to ask, whether what may seem voluntary and 
thus free, really does fulfill Locke’s definition of being at liberty in an action. 
One of Locke’s examples in the Essay to portray what he means by liberty is a 
man falling of a bridge after it broke apart under him. In this scenario, the 
man may will not to fall and thus be at liberty when it comes to volition; 
however, he is not free to end his fall and rise again, but must keep falling. 
Thus, he is not falling voluntarily, although theoretically, he very well could 
be if he were to will for him to fall down the bridge (Essay, II.XXI, § 9). If we 
compare this example with the contract signed to establish society, we can 
identify the man as the signatory, the fall as the signature and the earth’s 
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gravity, pulling down the man, as the disorder in the state of nature, which 
drives one into joining a political body.  
The remaining question then is, whether this comparison is valid. If the 
disorder of the state of nature is not as determining as gravity is in the case of 
a man falling off a bridge, then it is not. Intuitively, one might say that, a 
human in the state of nature might simply walk away from the contract and 
not sign it; then, this person would continue to live freely, even if threatened 
by others in life, liberty and estates. Does Locke provide us with any evidence 
of this scenario being a possibility? In fact he does and even acknowledges 
that there may be those who do not live in a political society. But, again, he 
argues that this will never be the case for a prolonged time, as such people 
will be “quickly driven into society” by the many inconveniences they must 
endure due to the transgressions of power by others in the state of nature 
(TT, IX, § 127). It appears then, that the determinant that drives one to sign 
Locke’s social contract, the disorder in the state of nature, is not an 
immediate restraint on an otherwise voluntary decision, but nevertheless 
forces humans to sign it in the long run. To a certain extent, Locke introduces 
an element of inevitability to his theory and the concept of a contract. In 
terms of how much this may pose a serious challenge to his argument will be 
discussed later; but first, let us remain with the question about how and when 
an agreement can be expressed about Locke’s contract or, in other words, 
when a signatories consent can be regarded as given. 
 
In academic literature, it has been widely discussed how literal the concept of 
consent is actually meant and how Locke responds to the objection that 
historically, consent has hardly ever actually been given to any government 
(Tuckness, 2016). As we have already seen, he establishes a distinction 
between explicit and tacit consent. Of course, the explicit consent is easily 
explained, although rarely seen, and we have discussed why humans enter 
the social contract, which is the ideal situation of consent as envisioned by 
Locke. With the tacit consent it is another matter; it is of a wholly different 
nature yet still needs to fulfill many of the characteristics of the explicit 
consent in order to be plausible. Importantly, the tacit consent needs to be 
just as freely given and thus, voluntary. It might already have become 
apparent to the reader that this is the next potential point of weakness in 
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Locke’s thought: It is not all too hard to imagine how one could be quite 
involuntarily give tacit consent for fear of the consequences of doing the 
opposite. If we employ Locke’s theory of the human will, which he claims is 
aligned to happiness, i.e. the multiplication of pleasure, the incoherency 
becomes clear. From a practical perspective, the effort of resistance that 
Locke demands of the unwilling members of a society would potentially be 
dangerous, thereby threatening their pleasure and thus, the happiness they 
are pursuing. Similarly, the social relations one has, all potential 
determinants of pleasure, may be severely impaired by one leaving an 
existing society. Surely, Locke would accept that this might be so, but that it 
is of less importance as the pleasure received from the signing of a new 
contract exceeds the pleasure that can be derived from the current situation. 
Therefore, this would only be a situation of conflicting wills, one in which the 
more pressing uneasiness would win out. However, whenever the will would 
be so determined as to cause such a reluctant person to stay in the polity, it 
can hardly be argued that the individual in that situation would thereby cease 
to disagree with said society. From the hedonist perspective Locke presents 
us with in the Essay, it is perfectly arguable that someone may receive more 
pleasure from remaining in a society than from resisting it; but it is at the 
very least unrealistic, if not entirely implausible, that such a person would be 
giving any political consent that can be regarded as providing legitimacy. In 
that case, the consent is no longer voluntary but necessary as a result of that 
person’s circumstances. It is thus no longer free and the tacit consent that 
was given is being dispossessed of its original argumentative purpose, namely 
to legitimize the political power that must remain to be exercised under the 
government theorized by Locke. Dunn (1967: 176) has argued that the 
consent Locke means is not interchangeable with submission and that 
consent implies a choice. This is essentially Locke’s own argument of 
voluntarism. Realistically though, it does not solve the problem of those 
members of a polity who will to remain as it is the less negative of two 
choices; Dunn refers to a presupposed external restraint that would make a 
real choice impossible. However, our argument here has been that the choice 
can be without restraint with regard to whatever outside restraint, but that 
only because one has willed for the polity out of the contemplation that it is 
the better option does not mean that said person believes it to be a good one, 
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let alone one that is compatible with one’s pursuit of happiness. This is 
especially problematic for Locke’s political theory because in it, consent 
legitimates power and is the only way for power to be morally wielded over 
someone. A member of society who consents because it is the better of two 
bad options, must certainly feel uneasy with being subject to political power 
she barely wills. In light of Locke’s theory of the will then, we can argue that 
it is incoherent with the doctrine of tacit consent; a doctrine that it is, 
practically speaking, much more relevant than that of explicit consent.  
 
4.3. Liberty through Suspension  
We shall now return to our original question about the will in Locke’s 
thought. So far, it has become clear that Locke believes humans to be 
generally free in their willing, in the sense that they are determined in it not 
by external forces, but by the uneasinesses they experience as a result of their 
desires. When it comes to the social contract and humans’ agreement to sign 
it, we have seen that Locke is indeed coherent and implicitly follows his 
explanation from the Essay as to why humans behave in the one or the other 
way: their hedonistic nature causes them to feel uneasy about the disorder in 
the state of nature and thus determines their will to sign the contract. But 
does such a thorough contemplation and foresighted decision not contradict 
Locke’s argument about the greater good, which is that humans are 
inherently unable to consider the longer-term outcomes of their actions, 
instead focusing on addressing present and urgent uneasinesses? One could 
indeed argue that the social contract is a greater good as defined by Locke. In 
fact, to sign the social contract, the signatories will have to overcome and 
waive the liberty they possessed prior to joining society, which would 
certainly be a severe present uneasiness. Following Locke’s own argument, 
the human will would in such a situation be determined to decide for 
addressing the more apparent uneasiness, which would arguably be that of 
the loss of their liberty. Thus, the potential signatories would shy away from 
the contract. This of course relates to our previous discussion about the 
problem within Locke’s argument of present and immediate determinations 
of the will as opposed to those that occur after due contemplation. Now, this 
issue resurfaces at the very heart of Locke’s political theory.  
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The ability to consider an action before executing it can be found as an idea in 
Locke’s doctrine of suspension. At its first mention in the chapter of Power, 
Locke does not immediately link this doctrine to the problem of the greater 
good. It is only later in his argument that he claims the suspension of an 
action in order to consider a greater good is the only way one may be at 
liberty to will, i.e. that it is the only situation in which one may forbear to will. 
In the case of the contract we can thus say that a potential signatory may 
suspend signing the contract in order to duly contemplate it first. Then, after 
having reached the conclusion that a greater good can be achieved through it, 
said signatory’s will may change and prefer the act of signing and thus 
entering a political body to the act of remaining in the state of nature. Locke 
contends that during this process of consideration we essentially re-
determine our objective of happiness, evaluating what choices will create the 
most pleasure and the least pain for us. Thus consideration drives us to new 
desires and, eventually, lets us perceive new and different uneasinesses, 
which then determine our will in a manner different than before (Essay, 
II.XXI, § 56).  
In addition to enabling us to recognize the greater good, the power of 
suspension is also the source for the mistakes that we make, according to 
Locke. We have previously theorized that he perhaps does not quite allow for 
an alternative to the social contract; thus, and because he must think his own 
theory superior and therefore argue in favor of it, Locke must also hold that 
not agreeing to the contract is a mistake. How does such a mistake come into 
being if suspension will help us realize the greater good, that is, the contract? 
Locke claims (Essay, II.XXI, § 56) that if one is too hasty in a decision after 
he has suspended it, “wrong measures of good and evil” may be used and, 
eventually, happiness is not achieved due to miscalculated decision and the 
action that followed it. The mistake of not agreeing to the social contract 
would then simply be a misreckoning that occurred after the potential 
signatory had suspended the action of agreeing or disagreeing in order to 
contemplate about it more appropriately. In this case though, wrong criteria 
were applied for the decision and people may have failed to recognize what 
would have made them happy.  
At this point, we have a much clearer picture of how the decision to sign or 
not to sign Locke’s contract can be aligned with his philosophical work in the 
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Essay. Although the initial uneasiness about the signature may, in some 
cases, be immediately more urgent and cause us to will against the contract, 
suspension allows for the greater good to take precedence and readjust our 
uneasinesses, eventually causing us to enter into the political body. However, 
that same mechanism of suspension may also give birth to the (possibly rare) 
mistake of choosing to remain in the state of nature, as suspension equally 
allows for miscalculation and fallacies. In this lies, as was previously 
suggested, but must again be underlined here, the liberty with regard to the 
act of willing for Locke; humans are free to will one way or the other, as only 
their own uneasinesses can determine what their minds prefer. It should be 
obvious then, that when combined and compared, Locke’s two theories from 
the Treatises and the Essay present us with a human being that freely 
chooses and indeed always must freely choose, the political system she enters 
into and does so according to whatever uneasiness she perceives and thus, 
what she wills. This freedom of choice is, arguably, one that is determined 
internally. The circumstances surrounding an individual may change and 
thus the uneasiness of an individual will also change. But suspension and 
everyone’s individually different understanding of what leads to happiness 
allow the mind to remain at liberty when exercising its power to will. In this, 
as we have seen, Locke argues coherently; however, external aspects may 
restrict the power of liberty and this adds another layer to our discussion. 
Despite a liberty present in the determination of the will, no liberty can exist 
in signing the contract where restraint external factors prevents one from 




With regard to what we have found about the comparison between the Essay 
and the Treatises, we must now address again the essential difference 
between being at liberty when willing and being generally at liberty at 
something. It has become clear that Locke is partially coherent with regard to 
the freedom to will the contract: The uneasiness of the state of nature will 
certainly cause the signatories to perceive an uneasiness that determines 
their will so that they are convinced to sign it. In short, their hedonism and 
self-interest will lead them to pursue what is best: the safe and protected life 
of the new polity; in this, the Essay and the Treatises paint the same picture. 
Even further, the immediate uneasiness they could possibly feel due to the 
loss of their natural liberty can be overcome by the doctrine of suspension 
with which humans can withhold a decision and consider a greater good. In 
fact, Locke believes himself that through suspension, greater liberty can be 
achieved.  
However, Locke’s theory of the liberty of volition does not quite cohere with 
his doctrine of tacit consent. It can be argued that a person who is already 
part of a polity decides to remain in it out of self-interest, yet chooses this as 
the better of two bad options and thus, becomes a member of society that 
only formally consents; given that the meaning of consent is to provide 
legitimacy for the power a state has over its citizens, such weak consent is 
hardly plausible to provide legitimacy. 
Now let us turn to the general liberty of joining: It has been shown that there 
is indeed an external restraint on the action of joining, which is the chaos and 
danger in the state of nature. Locke seems to be unable to accept that anyone 
would live outside a society for a prolonged period of time and thus, 
introduces a certain inevitability to his concept of the signatories’ consent. 
This relates of course to their freedom to will the signature as well; however, 
the external restraint signifies that the necessity of signing is possibly even 
stronger than just forcing new uneasiness on the mind, meaning that it is an 
inescapable scenario of the natural state. With this, we arrive (back) at a 
problem that connects Locke’s theory in the Essay with his political theory: 
Humans may be free to will the signing of the contract, but the disorder that 
drives them into signing it, all but proves that they also act under necessity 
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and are thus not voluntary or free actors. This also connects to the problem of 
the tacit consent and here we can find the liberty to will and the general 
liberty enjoined: The external restraint that results from an existing polity 
stands in the way of our pursuit of happiness and thus we choose not to 
resist, giving, almost unwillingly, tacit consent. Essentially, tacit consent is 
equivalent to the person in the room that is locked: the stay may be willing, 
but it is never voluntary. In fact, this particular problem is one of greater 
gravity than might be expected and potentially goes beyond Locke’s work. 
The issue is an argumentative one: If the contract is to be an adequate point 
in the case for the legitimacy of the polity Locke envisions, then it must be a 
free choice. Why is that so? Because only the freedom of the signatories to 
choose the contract can allow the society that follows from it to take away the 
boundless liberty that existed in the state of nature and that humans 
naturally possess. This is simply the theory of consent of the governed. We 
have seen however, that Locke indeed presents the contract as somewhat 
inevitable and thus, the freedom of signing it is quite disputable at least with 
regard to how voluntary it is. Strauss’ interpretation of the state of nature 
supports this notion: If the law of nature is a thought-experiment for 
explaining why a social contract is necessary, namely because the law will be 
transgressed eventually, thus requiring a polity to enforce it, then the signing 
of the contract is indeed all but inevitable. Possibly, Locke was as a narrator 
forced to construct his argument in this manner: on the one hand, the 
attempt to write a convincing theory required him to illustrate the necessity 
of a contract to the extent that it is almost inevitable. On the other hand, this 
has caused him to weaken the essential liberty of choice, which constitutes 
the (explicit) consent given by the signatories to the newly established polity.  
 
What does this tell us about liberal democracy, a political system that was 
largely a result of John Locke’s theoretical work? It tells us that if we assume 
a self-interested individual, humans will always find themselves in some sort 
of polity because such a structure will protect them and their rights. But, just 
like any other government, to provide that protection and, in fact, to be a 
stable political body, it must enforce its rules on its members. Inherent in 
Locke’s political theory is the problem of making his political vision 
convincing and inevitable at the same time. The main issue here is the 
 35 
tension between Locke’s vision of a state, which claims to be built on consent, 
and the fact that the same state must still execute power over its subjects. 
Locke’s way of escaping from that problem, namely the idea that we may 
freely give consent, is in so far insufficient as it can never be expected to be 
given by all members and without constraint. Therefore, some will be subject 
to power that they do not wish to be a subject to. Our application of Locke’s 
philosophy to his political theory has shown as much, as it demonstrated the 
inherent difficulties of defining humans as free agents while at the same time 
arguing for their willing subjection to a state (or anything for that matter). 
Regarding how liberalism post-Locke addressed this problem it may be 
briefly said that Immanuel Kant argued against a right of resistance and thus 
against the necessary consent of citizens (GE, 299 – 300), saying that those 
who make use of it place their own happiness above that of the rest of society 
(GE, 302 – 303). This, of course, sounds at the same time reminiscent of his 
deontological ethics but also of Locke’s construction of a self-interested 
individual that must align their choices with their pursuit of happiness. 
Perhaps contrary to intuition however, Kant did not believe that only citizens’ 
moral beliefs and their exercise of good ethics was the cure for this fallacy of 
liberalism. Instead, he famously argued that even a “people of devils” could 
build a good polity provided that they apply reason. All they need to do is to 
create and strictly abide by laws that balance private interest against each 
other (FR, 366 – 367). This solves Locke’s problem in so far as it argues for 
the irrelevance of the personal conviction of the members of society (even to 
the extent that they might be devils) and that the “goodness” of a society 
really only depends on how well it is designed in terms of its laws.  
Notwithstanding the challenges that were inherent in Locke’s philosophy and 
besides its historical influence, it also brought two radical changes: a new 
concept of anti- authoritarianism and the idea of social equality. The former 
can be found in many parts of his work (Aarsleff, 1997: 258) and we have 
seen it especially in his Treatise. Hans Aarsleff has argued (1997: 258) that a 
new human autonomy became possible through Locke’s empiricism and his 
attack on the principle of innate ideas. This was a direct renunciation of the 
valid understanding of the world at that time and “by banishing all thought of 
innate culpability and natural inferiority that had to be relieved by the 
intercession of traditionally sanctioned authorities, Locke gave mankind total 
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autonomy in the conduct of its affairs in this world”.  
The latter change, the equality of all, although presumably already evident in 
his doctrine of natural rights, is one that can also be deducted from the 
anthropology of Locke’s Essay: Wood has argued (1983: 176) that the 
construction of humans as roughly of equal ability at birth has enabled their 
empowerment as equal in worth. This is a central thought and consequence 
of the enlightenment and it is inherent in Locke’s thought. The anti-
authoritarianism and belief in natural equality is perfectly obvious to every 
reader not only of the Treatises, where it is explicitly stated, but also of the 
chapter of Power in the Essay. The hedonistic individual, satisfying its every 
uneasiness on the path to happiness, eventually achieves liberty through 
exactly that: pursuing happiness. In this, we may find a solution for Locke’s 
problem of the state that cannot be always consented to by everyone: If that 
is not possible, at least it can put the protection and cherishment of the 
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